EU Law Analysis: Fair movement of people: equal treatment? (Part Two)


Catherine Barnard and Sarah Fraser Butlin*

*The authors are both at the University of Cambridge and funded by
the ESRC’s UK in a Changing Europe programme

Introduction

In the first blog (here),
we argued that a future UK/EU migration policy should be based around the
notion of fair – not free – movement. One element of this would be a work
permit scheme dependent on having genuine employed or self-employed activity
(or sufficient resources for migrants and their families), accompanied by a
simplified registration scheme, based on the scheme already used for Croatian
migrants.

A second element of our scheme would include possible restrictions
on the principle of equal treatment in respect of both work and access to
benefits.  We suggest that the UK needs
to utilise the restrictions on equal treatment that already exist in the
Citizens’ Rights Directive 2004/38 while developing the restrictions on the
equal treatment principle contained in the Brussels New Settlement Agreement
negotiated by David Cameron in February 2016. 
We suggest that this may (eventually) be acceptable to the EU because it
reflects both the origins of the free movement provisions in the EU and a
political realisation that free movement is less popular than it was for
Western EU states. Anything negotiated for the UK might offer a path for
Austria, Denmark, Germany and other Member States to restrict access to
benefits to EU migrants in the first years of their arrival.

II Origins of Free
Movement and the equal treatment principle

The 1948 Paris Treaty saw free movement as a way of optimising a
natural resource, namely labour, but one which was subsidiary to the objective
of seeking full employment for national workers. However, it was also clear
that where host States chose to use migrant workers, they had to ensure that
migrants enjoyed satisfactory conditions, albeit not necessarily equal
treatment. Nevertheless within a year, the five signatory States (Belgium,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK) of the Brussels Treaty
recognised the need for equal treatment of migrant workers in relation to
social security and concluded the Multilateral Convention on Social Security. 

In 1951, the Treaty founding the European Community for Coal and
Steel (ECSC) made provision, by way of Article 69(1), for non-discrimination on
the grounds of nationality in the coal and steel industries of workers of
proven qualifications, subject to the “limitations imposed by the fundamental
needs of health and public order”. 

Thus, even before formal discussions about the establishment of the
Common, now Single, Market, had begun, ideas of equal treatment of migrant
workers and the interrelationship between free movement of labour and social
security provision were already in play as a means of facilitating the free
movement of labour. In the proposals of the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC)
in June 1956, free movement was to be defined as ‘the right to present oneself
in any country of the Community to the posts advertised and to remain in that
country if a job is actually obtained’ and this was without ‘any restriction
which does not apply to national workers themselves’ i.e. they had to enjoy the
principle of non-discrimination which was delivered by Article 45(2) TFEU.

Scroll forward through the ensuing half century and the principle of
equal treatment is extended to those EU migrants who were not fully
economically active (students, the retired and persons of independent means
(PIMs)), and even those without resources by a combination of the Citizens’
Rights Directive 2004/38 (CRD) and the Treaty provisions including those on EU
citizenship.

The CRD already contains limits on the right to equal treatment. For
those who are not economically active, they are not entitled to equal treatment
in respect of social assistance (benefits for the very poor) for the first
three months, nor are they entitled to equal treatment in respect of student
grants and loans until they have been in the host country for 5 years. The five
year restriction on students grants and loans also applies to those who are
economically and semi-economically active. Nevertheless, those who are
economically active enjoy equal treatment from day one in respect of all other
matters. However, the principle of equal treatment has always allowed states to
impose, say, a one-year residence requirement before receiving a benefit
although only if the residence requirement can be objectively justified and is
proportionate.

Notwithstanding the possibilities open to the UK to restrict equal
treatment, these limitations were not sufficient for many UK voters. In the
run-up to the referendum in the UK there were concerns about EU workers
claiming equal treatment in respect of in work benefits such as tax credits.
There was particular concern about equal treatment for those who were not
economically active. The EU ‘benefit scrounger’ became the bogeyman of the UK’s
referendum.

III Recent Court of
Justice jurisprudence on citizenship

There were signs that the Court of Justice (CJEU) had started to
listen to these concerns, especially about equal treatment for those not
economically active. For example, in Collins the
CJEU held that a habitual residence requirement prior to claiming a benefit
could be objectively justified by the need to ensure that there was a genuine
link between the applicant for an allowance and the geographic employment
market in question. This decision chimed with a broader recognition by both the
Tory and Labour parties that there was a need for “fair contribution” before
benefits should be paid.
In Dano (discussed
here)
the Court suggested that, in the case of a person who was not economically
active, the right of lawful residence, acquired by demonstrating possession of comprehensive
sickness insurance and sufficient resources, as required by the CRD, was a precondition
to the enjoyment of the principle of equal treatment. The Court held expressly
that benefit tourism would not be encouraged. 
In Commission v UK
(discussed here)
the Court confirmed that there was nothing to prevent the grant of social
benefits to Union citizens who were not economically active being made subject
to the substantive condition of a right to lawfully reside in the Member State.

Thus, the recent case law puts considerable power in the hands of
the host Member States: individuals can be excluded from even relying on the
equal treatment principle if they do not satisfy the requirements of the CRD.
Even if they do satisfy those requirements, states can still impose residence
requirements as a precondition to entitlement to benefits, provided those
residence requirements are justified and proportionate, and states can impose
checks to verify this. There were signs that the Court was beginning to let states
take back some control of its welfare states.

IV        “New Settlement” agreement

Some of the restrictions on the principle of equal treatment and
benefits recognised by the Court were incorporated in David Cameron’s now
defunct ‘New Settlement’ or Brussels Agreement, negotiated with the EU in
February 2016. It effectively codified the CJEU’s decisions in Dano and, another case decided at much
the same time, Alimanovic (discussed
here):
Member States could refuse to grant social benefits to people who did not have
sufficient resources to claim a right of residence or who were solely entitled
to reside because of their job search. 

However, more significantly the Brussels Agreement introduced the
idea that there could be an emergency brake on in-work benefits. The agreement
proposed amending Regulation 492/2011 ’to take account of a pull factor arising
from a Member State’s in-work benefits regime‘ in order to ‘provide for an
alert and safeguard mechanism that responds to situations of inflow of workers
from other Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an extended period of
time’. A Member State wishing to use the mechanism would notify the Commission
and the Council that ‘such an exceptional situation exists on a scale that
affects essential aspects of its social security system, including the primary
purpose of its in-work benefits system, or which leads to difficulties which
are serious and liable to persist in its employment market or are putting an
excessive pressure on the proper functioning of its public services’.

The proposed mechanism was for the Commission to examine the
notification and for the Council to authorise the member state, by way of an
implementing act, to restrict access to in-work welfare benefits ‘to the extent
necessary’ for a total period of up to four years from commencement of
employment.

The rules were sophisticated but needed some careful explaining and,
as anyone involved in the referendum discovered, the need to explain meant the
debate was lost. However, we suggest that the Brussels agreement, which never
came into force following the Leave vote, may help inform any future agreement
with the EU in respect of limiting the equal treatment principle.

V. The equal treatment
principle in the model of fair movement?

So what might the new scheme of equal treatment look like under our
proposed immigration regime? In just the way that the founder Member States
recognised that there should be some limits on equal treatment for migrants, we
accept that there needs to be some limits on that equal treatment in order to
respect the concerns expressed in the referendum. Following the model of the
Croatian scheme, proposed in the previous blog, a Croatian national becomes
entitled to social security after 12 months of authorised work. This might be
the starting point for the new scheme. However, under the Croatian scheme,
those in authorised work are entitled to means-tested benefits. Under any new
scheme the UK might argue for no means tested benefits such as tax credits for
12 months. More radically, the UK might want to return to the model proposed in
the New Settlement Agreement where in-work benefits for those on the lowest pay
be phased in over four years of residence.

VI.       Conclusions

Given what was achieved by the Brussels negotiations, together with
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, is it possible to envisage some form
of evolving concept of fair movement, providing a flexible but controlled
approach to migration that is strongly aligned to the needs of the labour
market, as those negotiating the original version of the Treaty advocated? We
are advocating the utilisation of tools already found in the CRD and possibly
in the New Settlement Agreement. The rights would apply to those EU/EEA
nationals in a recognised category – as a (genuine) worker (as defined in the
previous blog, with minimum income thresholds and hours of work?), a
self-employed person or a service provider.

EU/EEA nationals could also move as a student or a person of
independent means, both needing to show comprehensive sickness insurance and
sufficient resources, terms which should be more substantively defined. And
they should be registered in the place of residence, with relevant
documentation proving their entitlement which employers would need to check
before offering work, higher education establishments would check before
admission and providers of public services would need to check before offering
those services. Once entitlement is established, the principle of equal
treatment is applied but phased as the CRD currently provides and nuanced as in
the case law of the Court of Justice and in accordance with the terms of New
Settlement Agreement.  In particular, the
use of residence requirements as a limitation on access to social security
benefits would enable the Government to challenge criticisms of “benefit
tourism”.

We would suggest that this tempering of the free movement of persons
would achieve a balance between the political, social and cultural concerns
about immigration with a desire for fairness to EEA migrants. It draws on some
of the old thinking: the early drafters of European documents on free movement
grappled with some of the issues that are now being faced in the UK. While
equal treatment has been at the core, it is a notion which has long been
qualified both by the EU’s secondary legislation and the case law of the Court.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 27, chapter 13

Photo credit: politicshome.com



Source link

Related posts

Leave a Comment